China, Energy and Geopolitics during the Middle East Crisis – Event Summary

The Cambridge Middle East and North Africa Forum (MENAF), in collaboration with the Middle East Institute at the National University of Singapore, hosted an online discussion examining China’s evolving role in the Middle East amid the war involving Iran, Israel and the United States. The event explored how regional instability, disruptions to global energy markets and intensifying great power competition were reshaping Beijing’s diplomatic and strategic calculations. Particular attention was given to China’s energy security, its relationships with regional powers and the broader implications of the conflict for the international order.

China’s Diplomatic Position Amid the Iran War

The discussion began by examining the implications of the Iran war for China’s diplomatic position in the Middle East. The conflict was presented as a significant challenge to the existing regional order, but also as a potential opportunity for Beijing to expand its diplomatic influence.

China’s position was considered in the context of developments following the October 2023 Hamas attacks on Israel, the subsequent conflicts in Gaza and Lebanon, and the weakening of Iran’s regional network of allies and armed groups. These developments had initially constrained China’s diplomatic room for manoeuvre, particularly as the United States assumed an increasingly direct role in regional security affairs.

However, the escalation into direct confrontation involving Iran and the United States was assessed as potentially changing this dynamic. One argument suggested that Washington’s military involvement could restrict its diplomatic flexibility and divert strategic attention from its longer-term competition with Beijing.

China, by contrast, had largely avoided direct military involvement while maintaining its emphasis on economic cooperation, regional stability and diplomatic engagement. The discussion considered whether this approach could strengthen Beijing’s standing among Middle Eastern governments seeking alternatives to dependence on American leadership.

Nevertheless, the limits of Chinese influence remained contested. While China’s economic relationships provided substantial regional leverage, its limited military presence and reluctance to assume security responsibilities raised questions about its ability to shape the outcome of major regional crises.

Energy Security and the Strait of Hormuz

A central theme was the impact of disruptions to the Strait of Hormuz on China’s energy security. As one of the world’s largest energy consumers and oil importers, China remained exposed to instability affecting Gulf hydrocarbon exports and international shipping.

The discussion examined how Beijing had developed several strategic buffers to reduce its vulnerability to interruptions in energy supplies. Long-term diversification of oil imports was identified as an important element of this approach, with China maintaining relationships with multiple suppliers rather than relying excessively on a single country.

Russia’s growing role as an energy supplier was highlighted, particularly given the availability of overland pipelines that bypass maritime chokepoints vulnerable to Middle Eastern conflicts.

China’s strategic petroleum reserves were also discussed as a significant short-term safeguard. Estimates presented during the event suggested that existing stockpiles could cover approximately 70–100 days of imports, potentially providing a longer buffer if alternative suppliers continued delivering oil during a Gulf disruption.

Beyond supply diversification, the expansion of electric vehicles and renewable energy was examined as a structural factor reducing China’s dependence on imported oil. Growing electric vehicle adoption, alongside the increasing contribution of non-fossil-fuel electricity generation, was presented as strengthening China’s resilience to international oil price shocks.

However, the discussion also emphasised that energy diversification could not eliminate China’s exposure to the Gulf. A substantial proportion of Chinese oil imports continued to originate in the region, while disruptions to global energy markets could affect China’s broader economic interests regardless of its domestic reserves.

Maritime Chokepoints and Global Supply Chains

The discussion expanded beyond energy supplies to consider the strategic significance of maritime trade routes connecting the Middle East with Europe and East Asia.

The Strait of Hormuz, Bab el-Mandeb, Suez Canal and Strait of Malacca were identified as interconnected chokepoints through which energy, industrial materials, food and manufactured goods move across the global economy.

Regional instability was therefore presented as a systemic challenge rather than a geographically contained security problem. Disruptions to shipping routes could rapidly affect production, trade and supply chains far beyond the Middle East.

The role of non-state armed groups was particularly important in this context. The Red Sea crisis demonstrated how actors without the conventional capabilities of major states could nevertheless disrupt international commerce by threatening strategically important maritime passages.

The discussion consequently highlighted the continuing importance of geography in an interconnected global economy. Despite technological advances and the expansion of alternative energy sources, control over maritime access and the security of commercial shipping remained fundamental considerations in international relations.

US–China Competition and the Regional Security Order

The evolving relationship between China and the United States formed another major focus of the event.

The discussion characterised the emerging international order as increasingly shaped by strategic competition between Washington and Beijing, although without the rigid alliance structures associated with the Cold War.

Middle Eastern governments were described as pursuing more flexible foreign policies, maintaining security relationships with the United States while expanding economic and technological cooperation with China.

This pattern of strategic hedging was particularly evident among Gulf states seeking to diversify their international partnerships without becoming exclusively aligned with either power.

An important distinction emerged between the two countries’ regional roles. The United States continued to provide substantial military capabilities, deterrence and maritime security, while China remained primarily engaged through trade, investment, infrastructure and energy partnerships.

The sustainability of this arrangement was debated. One perspective suggested that China’s ability to benefit from regional economic relationships without assuming comparable military commitments represented a strategic advantage.

An alternative interpretation questioned whether Beijing could sustain its influence indefinitely without demonstrating a greater willingness to provide security guarantees or exercise hard power.

These contrasting assessments reflected a broader disagreement about the nature of international influence and whether economic interdependence, diplomatic engagement or military capabilities would prove decisive in shaping the future regional order.

Regional Alignments and China’s Diplomatic Choices

The discussion also examined changing relationships among Middle Eastern powers, including Iran, Israel, Turkey, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates.

The weakening of parts of Iran’s regional network, the growing diplomatic influence of Turkey and Qatar, and the development of security cooperation associated with the Abraham Accords were considered important elements of regional realignment.

These developments raised questions about how China might balance its longstanding relationship with Iran against its substantial economic interests in the Gulf Arab states and Israel.

The possibility of Beijing adopting a more explicitly pragmatic approach towards regional partnerships was explored alongside an alternative vision of Chinese diplomacy centred on non-intervention and regional collective security.

The discussion considered whether China might support security arrangements negotiated among Middle Eastern states themselves, rather than assume the role of an external military guarantor.

Differences also emerged over the interpretation of Chinese foreign policy. Some assessments emphasised strategic calculations and material interests, while others highlighted the importance of historical experience, political ideas and perceptions of the international order in shaping Beijing’s decisions.

The Future of China’s Role in the Middle East

The concluding discussion returned to the central question of whether the Iran war would strengthen or constrain China’s long-term position in the Middle East.

China’s economic importance, diversified energy relationships and preference for diplomatic engagement were identified as sources of strategic resilience. At the same time, its limited security role and continued dependence on international maritime trade presented significant constraints.

The event highlighted the possibility that prolonged American involvement in regional conflict could create additional diplomatic and economic opportunities for Beijing. However, the consequences would depend on the trajectory of the war, the future of Iran’s political system and the choices made by regional governments.

Ultimately, the discussion demonstrated that China’s role in the Middle East could no longer be understood solely through energy imports or commercial investment. The region had become an important arena in the wider contest over international influence, security provision and economic connectivity.

Whether China would continue prioritising economic diplomacy or gradually assume greater responsibility for regional stability remained an open question, with significant implications for both the Middle East and the evolving global order.