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The Cambridge Middle East and North Africa Forum (MENAF), in collaboration with City St George’s, University of London and the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), hosted a discussion examining relations between Israel and Turkey amid profound changes in the Middle East’s political and security landscape. The event considered how the war in Gaza, the weakening of Iranian regional influence, the collapse of the Assad regime in Syria and changing patterns of international power had reshaped the strategic calculations of both countries.
A central question was whether Israel and Turkey were entering a period of sustained regional confrontation or whether their competing interests could be managed through pragmatic diplomacy and security arrangements.
Turkey’s Strategic Autonomy and Global Position
The discussion began by examining Turkey’s evolving foreign policy within an increasingly multipolar international system.
Turkey’s approach was characterised as an effort to manage multiple dependencies rather than choose between competing geopolitical blocs. Although firmly connected to Western institutions through NATO, European economic relationships and longstanding diplomatic partnerships, Ankara had expanded its engagement with Russia, China, Central Asia and the wider Global South.
This diversification was reflected in Turkey’s growing diplomatic network, changing trade patterns and expanding defence industry. Turkish military exports, particularly drones, had strengthened the country’s international presence and increased its influence in regional conflicts.
Nevertheless, the pursuit of strategic autonomy involved significant constraints. Turkey continued to depend on European markets and Western investment while maintaining substantial energy and commercial relationships with Russia and China. Its acquisition of Russian S-400 missile systems, which resulted in exclusion from the American F-35 programme, illustrated the potential costs of balancing competing strategic relationships.
Energy dependence was identified as another major vulnerability, limiting Ankara’s ability to respond freely to Western pressure over relations with Moscow.
The broader conclusion was that Turkey sought greater international influence without abandoning the institutions and economic relationships on which its security and prosperity continued to depend.
Regional Realignment and the Gaza War
The discussion situated Israel–Turkey relations within the wider transformation of the Middle East following the Arab uprisings and the war that began on 7 October 2023.
Three broad regional groupings were examined: an Iranian-aligned network involving Hezbollah, Hamas, the Houthis and other armed actors; a Turkish-centred set of relationships; and a looser grouping involving Israel and several Arab states, particularly those associated with regional normalisation agreements.
The weakening of Iran’s regional position, including the collapse of its Syrian ally, had altered the balance between these groupings. This created new opportunities for both Israel and Turkey while increasing the potential for direct competition.
The Gaza war was presented as a major turning point whose political and historical interpretation remained contested. Different explanations of its causes, conduct and prolongation were considered, alongside its unprecedented human and material consequences.
Despite the transformation of regional relationships, several enduring features were identified, including the unresolved Israeli–Palestinian conflict, the longevity of established political leadership and the continuing importance of American diplomacy.
The discussion also connected the conflict to wider economic competition between China’s Belt and Road Initiative and the proposed India–Middle East–Europe Economic Corridor. Prospects for regional integration and Israeli–Saudi normalisation were viewed as closely connected to developments in Gaza.
Syria as the Principal Arena of Competition
Post-Assad Syria emerged as the most immediate and consequential area of competition between Israel and Turkey.
Turkey’s objectives included securing its southern border, addressing the presence of Kurdish armed groups, facilitating the partial return of Syrian refugees and participating in Syria’s political and economic reconstruction.
The integration of the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces into a unified Syrian military was identified as particularly important to Ankara’s security calculations. Turkey also sought to support the emerging government in Damascus while avoiding excessive dependence on any single Syrian political actor.
Although Turkey had gained considerable influence following Assad’s collapse, the discussion cautioned against portraying Ankara as Syria’s undisputed political architect. Saudi Arabia, Qatar and the United States had become increasingly important to Syria’s diplomatic rehabilitation, financial recovery and international legitimacy.
Israel’s priorities differed significantly. Its security establishment remained concerned about the emergence of a potentially hostile, Turkish-supported government in Damascus, the protection of minority communities and the preservation of operational freedom in Syrian airspace.
These competing priorities created a risk of military escalation. Israeli operations against military infrastructure associated with Turkish interests were discussed as examples of how Syria could become a setting for miscalculation.
Nevertheless, the existence of bilateral deconfliction arrangements demonstrated that practical communication continued despite increasingly confrontational political rhetoric.
The Evolution of Israel–Turkey Relations
The historical relationship between Israel and Turkey provided an important framework for understanding their current rivalry.
Relations had moved through periods of discreet cooperation, close diplomatic and security engagement during the 1990s, and growing friction under successive Turkish governments.
The Palestinian question remained a persistent source of tension, particularly following the Gaza war. Turkey’s political support for the Palestinian cause and its relationships with Hamas had contributed to a sharp deterioration in public relations.
The discussion distinguished between hostile rhetoric and the practical conduct of foreign policy. Although mutual distrust had intensified, both governments retained incentives to avoid direct confrontation.
From an Israeli strategic perspective, Turkey’s expanding diplomatic, military and economic presence across Syria, the Eastern Mediterranean, Libya and other regions increasingly appeared as a challenge to Israel’s regional position.
However, the relationship was not regarded as inevitably confrontational. Historical cooperation, shared connections with Washington and continuing security dialogue provided possible foundations for managing disputes.
The United States, Gulf States and Regional Mediation
American involvement was identified as a crucial factor in determining whether Israeli–Turkish competition could be contained.
Both governments sought productive relationships with the Trump administration, although their expectations and strategic positions differed. The United States retained the capacity to facilitate communication and reduce the likelihood of escalation between two important regional partners.
Saudi Arabia’s growing role in Syria and its potential involvement in future regional normalisation arrangements were also examined. Its financial resources and diplomatic influence made it a significant actor in determining the balance of power.
Qatar’s close relationship with Turkey added another dimension, particularly through security cooperation, diplomatic mediation and regional political influence.
Azerbaijan was discussed as a potential intermediary because of its strong relationships with both Israel and Turkey and its established defence and economic cooperation with Ankara.
Strategic Competition and the Future Regional Order
The audience discussion broadened the analysis to include Iran’s future, the position of ethnic and minority communities, refugee movements, reconstruction financing and the causes of persistent regional conflict.
Particular attention was given to the interaction between external intervention, weakened international constraints and increasingly assertive middle powers. The expansion of regional military activity was considered alongside the decline of established diplomatic frameworks and the changing role of the United States.
The event concluded that Israel and Turkey were navigating a regional order characterised by greater uncertainty, competing spheres of influence and significant opportunities for both cooperation and confrontation.
Syria remained the clearest test of whether their rivalry could be managed through pragmatic security arrangements. More broadly, the trajectory of their relationship would depend on developments in Gaza, American diplomacy, Gulf engagement and the ability of both governments to distinguish their core security interests from wider ambitions for regional influence.
Ultimately, the discussion highlighted a Middle East in which established alliances were being reassessed, regional powers were exercising greater autonomy and the balance between competition and cooperation remained unresolved.